Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications

Philosophy, Department of

6-2009

Putting Unity in Its Place: Organic Unity in Plato’s Phaedrus
Franco Trivigno
Marquette University, franco.trivigno@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/phil_fac
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Trivigno, Franco, "Putting Unity in Its Place: Organic Unity in Plato’s Phaedrus" (2009). Philosophy Faculty
Research and Publications. 134.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/phil_fac/134

Putting Unity in Its Place:
Organic Unity in Plato’s
Phaedrus
Franco V. Trivigno

The notion of organic unity has had a long history in aesthetics and
art criticism.1 It is a normative aesthetic ideal, which historically has
been applied to several of the ﬁne arts, most prominently painting and
literature. Both organic unity itself and its critical uses have their origin
in Plato’s Phaedrus. In the dialogue, Socrates introduces this notion in
order to criticize Lysias’ speech, which Phaedrus greatly admires. The
main goal of this paper is to get clearer on what Plato means by organic
unity as a normative principle for writing. I ﬁrst formulate what I will
call the principle of organic unity [OU], and then subject it to a rigorous
critique.2 I argue that the principle is incompatible with earlier claims
in the dialogue, that it warrants unfair criticisms of Lysias’ speech and
that it fails to account for far more serious charges against Lysias. I claim
that the principle as stated by Socrates is deﬁcient as a critical tool and
intentionally incomplete, primarily because it does not accommodate
the main intention or purpose of a speech. The principle as implied in
the Phaedrus is, I argue, teleological, incorporating a uniﬁed function or
purpose with respect to the souls of its audience. I attempt to reconstitute
the organic ideal and to restore its proper context in the larger discussion
of writing by amending the principle in several stages. In the end, I test
the reconstructed principle by using it to assess Plato’s own intentions in
writing the Phaedrus and the unity of the Phaedrus itself.3
I
At the end of Lysias’ speech, Phaedrus’ enthusiasm for it is evident.
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Visibly “lit up by the speech,” he calls it “extraordinary, both in language
and other respects” (234c-d).4 Phaedrus declares that no other could
“make a greater or better speech on the same theme (tou autou pragmatos)”
(234e), on the grounds that Lysias “didn’t leave out any of the items that
are naturally implied by the topic” and “everything was given a worthy
treatment” (235b). Later in the dialogue (263d-266d), Socrates introduces
the ideal of organic unity speciﬁcally to clarify his criticisms of Lysias’
speech. He says:
Every speech like a living creature should be put together with its own
body so that it is not without a head or without a foot but has a middle and
extremities, written in such a way that its parts ﬁt together and form a
whole. (264c)

The account, as stated, seems primarily to refer to the internal
organization of the different parts of a speech.5 Socrates refers to the
“compelling logic of composition,” or alternatively, “logographic
necessity” (tina ananchên logographikên), with which a speech ought to be
composed (264b7).
There are “two forms or aspects (duoin eidoin),” which contribute to
the organic unity of a speech. First, one should begin, as Socrates did
in his ﬁrst speech, with a deﬁnition of the main topic under discussion
(265d). Beginning with a deﬁnition allows for “the speech to progress
with clarity and internal consistency” (265d). Second, one should proceed
to an analysis, which divides a topic at its natural joints:
To have the power, conversely, to cut up a composition, form by form
according to its natural joints and not to try to hack through any part as
a bad butcher might .... [J]ust as the body, which is one thing, is naturally
divided into pairs of things with both parts having the same name (called,
for example, left arm and right arm), so also [Socrates’] two speeches
assumed that madness is by its nature one form in us, though capable of
being divided into two parts. (265e-266a)

Taken together, these two activities constitute the dialectical method of
“collection and division,” of which Socrates claims to be “a lover” (266b).
They confer nothing less than “the ability to speak and think” (266b).
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This account sets the bar for an organically uniﬁed speech extremely
high. Notice that the ability to fashion a proper deﬁnition depends on
prior knowledge of the form or essence of the deﬁniens. Socrates refers
to the ability to fashion a deﬁnition as requiring “someone whose sight
can bring into a single form (mian idean) things which previously have
been scattered in all directions” (265d). Knowledge of the form is, on this
account, a necessary condition of an organically uniﬁed speech. Thus, the
existence of an organically uniﬁed speech is predicated on the existence
of a dialectician, one skilled in the method of collection and division, who
is a perfect knower with respect to the topic at hand.6
At this point, it might be useful to formulate the principle of organic
unity [OU] in order to assess it:
[OU] A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a compelling
logic of composition which begins with an accurate deﬁnition, proceeds to
analyze the topic according to its nature, and is written by someone with
dialectical knowledge of the topic.

I want to articulate ﬁve related criticisms of this ideal from prior sections
of the Phaedrus itself in order to motivate my distinction between the
organic ideal as stated and as implied. I am not here criticizing the ideal as
stated from a perspective outside the text, but rather attempting to show
that the ideal’s inadequacy can be articulated from within the dialogue’s
own perspective. This provides at least partial warrant for my claim that
it is meant to be reformulated.
First, Phaedrus is right to object that “the rhetorical part has escaped”
(266c). While rhetoric had been earlier deﬁned as “a certain guiding of
the souls (psychagôgia tis)” (261a7-8), the ideal as stated is indifferent to
audience. Second, to the extent that audience is implicitly acknowledged,
the account of dialectical knowledge makes it instrumental to the goal
of audience deception. Knowledge confers the ability to lead another
“incrementally, step by small step, through similarities away from the
truth to its opposite” (262b). Third, Socrates’ ideal omits any mention
of style. The organic ideal as stated would seem to favor a technically
precise discourse, one conducive to the expression of a clear deﬁnition
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and unequivocal analyses. However, both of Socrates’ own speeches were
stylistically distinct, the ﬁrst being similar to Lysias’ in its use of certain
rhetorical tropes, and the second speech is highly poetic and rich in vividly
erotic imagery. Fourth, Socrates’ account fails its own rational test by
not making the relevant distinctions, or cuts, regarding its own topic:
speeches. Socrates does not clearly distinguishing between written and
spoken speeches. His principle of organic unity is expressly a criterion
for written speeches, but he applies it equally to his own speeches, both of
which were extemporaneous. Fifth, the ideal contains no reference to erôs,
or the kind of relationship that must obtain between two people in order
for the erôs for the forms to be inspired and nourished. This is peculiar,
since erôs was the foundation of Socrates’ mythic account in the Palinode.
Socrates calls himself a lover of collections and divisions (266b3), but love
of a method seems very far from the throbbing, aching, soul-consuming
love for one’s beloved and the reverential awe and terror caused by the
memory of the form provoked through him, as vividly described in the
Palinode (251aff.).
In the next section, I will pursue yet another criticism of the organic
ideal: it does not adequately characterize what is wrong with Lysias’
speech, though this is why Socrates introduced it in the ﬁrst place.
II
The ideal of organic unity is not articulated as an independent aesthetic
principle, but rather for use as a critical tool in order to assess Lysias’
speech. It is the beginning of the speech that Socrates scrutinizes:
You understand my affairs, and you’ve already heard how I think they help
us both, when things work out. Nor do I expect to fail to get what I ask for
just because I don’t happen to be in love with you.
When lovers lose their passion, they come to regret whatever beneﬁts they
may have conferred. (230e-231a)

Socrates interrupts Phaedrus before he ﬁnishes the last sentence the ﬁrst
time they critique it (262e), but allows him to ﬁnish when they repeat it to
set up the second criticism (263e-264a). This is done to emphasize that the
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ﬁrst criticism is focused solely on the ﬁrst paragraph, whereas the second
concerns the relation between the ﬁrst two paragraphs of the speech.
Socrates asserts two main criticisms: ﬁrst, Lysias does not clearly deﬁne
love at the beginning of his speech; second, he proceeds in a way that is
not logical or systematic but that seems spontaneous. Both criticisms aim
to show that Lysias is not someone who knows the truth about his subject,
thus making his speech both laughable and artless (262c). However, the
ideal fails as a critical tool on two basic counts: the criticisms are unfair,
and they omit more serious problems.
Socrates’ ﬁrst criticism begins from the claim that, regarding some
topics, like iron and silver, we generally agree about what we mean by
them, while regarding others, like goodness and justice, we generally
disagree (263a). The good orator will know which topics belong to the
‘shared class,’ and which to the ‘disputed class’ (263b). Erôs clearly belongs
to the disputed class, and this ambiguity is just what makes it ripe for
rhetorical manipulation. For the disputed class, it is necessary to compel
one’s audience to see the topic as a determinate thing by deﬁning it at
the beginning. Unlike Socrates’ emphatic deﬁnition at the beginning of
his own speech, Lysias did not begin with a deﬁnition and thus did not
“compel (ênankasen) us to see erôs as one deﬁnite thing (the way he wanted
us to see him)” (263d).
Socrates’ second criticism follows immediately upon the ﬁrst. The
speech does not follow any logical order—there is no “compelling logic
of composition”—but rather “the elements of the speech were poured
out in a heap” (264b). Lysias begins “at the end, swimming through the
speech upstream on his back, beginning with what a lover would say to
his darling after his love is gone” (264a).7 Lysias’ speech begins at the end
in two senses: ﬁrst, by beginning in the ﬁrst paragraph with what looks
like a summarization of a speech already given; and second, by making
the second paragraph begin with the end of the love affair, rather than
the beginning. Indeed, Socrates concludes, like the epigram on the tomb
of Midas, “it hardly matters in what order” one reads the parts of Lysias’
speech (264d-e).
Taken together, Socrates’ two criticisms amount to the claim that Lysias’
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speech lacks organic unity, as it lacks a clear deﬁnition and logical analysis
of its topic. Since it lacks these, Socrates concludes that the speech is
artless and that Lysias does not know the truth about love and thus does
not possess the art of rhetoric. Many commentators have taken Socrates’
critique as devastating.8 A clear assessment of these criticisms, however,
will reveal various difﬁculties for Socrates’ account. As I hope to show,
Phaedrus was not entirely wrong to be excited about—indeed, to be lit up
by—Lysias’ speech.9
Socrates seems to infer, from the lack of a clear deﬁnition of ‘love,’ a
failure on the part of Lysias to recognize ‘love’ as a member of the disputed
class of topics. Had Lysias properly recognized love as disputable, he
would have begun with a deﬁnition. But this seems wrong on several
counts. First, Lysias clearly recognizes that love is ambiguous. The
disputable nature of love forms the very core of his argument in favor of
taking a non-lover.10 Lysias does not deny that there are some beneﬁts from
love, but for every beneﬁt, one can expect at least equal harm. By taking a
non-lover, one gets all the beneﬁts of love, without all of its problems and
hassles. Second, a clear deﬁnition would actually make his speech easier
to refute. The lack of a clear deﬁnition, according to Socrates, prevents
Lysias from getting us to see Erôs “the way [Lysias] wanted us to see [Erôs]”
(263e). But one knows exactly where to attack a speech that begins with a
deﬁnition. The weight of the core claim of Lysias’ speech, by contrast, is
diffused amongst the many examples. Lysias does get his audience to see
love in the way that he wants precisely because he does not deﬁne it in
the beginning.11 Third, the criticism assumes that explication rather than
persuasion is the goal of the speech. This is wrong in two ways: ﬁrst, the
ﬁctional non-lover wants the boy to whom he is speaking to take him as
a lover; and second, Lysias is trying to show, through his artful defense
of an implausible claim, that one should employ him as a speech-writer.
Neither of these goals is necessarily tied to an explication of the nature of
love. Finally, Socrates’ criticism takes the ﬁctional non-lover as equivalent
to, or at least standing in for, Lysias. Socrates, by contrast, several times
resists being identiﬁed with his non-lover (235c-d, 237a-b, 238d, 242d,
244a, 257b, 263d). Even if it did follow that the absence of a deﬁnition
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were evidence for a speaker’s failure to recognize the disputed nature of
his topic, it surely does not follow from the fact that the ﬁctional non-lover
does not deﬁne love that Lysias did not recognize it as disputable. Nor
does it follows that Lysias does not know what love is.
Socrates’ second criticism, that the speech is thrown together in a heap
or lacks a compelling logic of composition, also seems misguided. Socrates
himself implicitly acknowledges what is misguided about the criticism,
when he claims that Lysias seemed to have said “not without some
nobility, whatever came to his mind as he wrote” (264b). This appearance
of spontaneity is surely intentional, and as above, part of the rhetorical
technique Lysias means to employ in order to effect persuasion. First, the
speech is obviously meant as something one says while already in the process
of seducing a boy. This speech could not possibly be the ﬁrst thing one said
to a boy—rather, it would be something that one works into an already
ongoing conversation after having stated one’s interest, one’s proposal
and one’s lack of love. So this beginning at the end is hardly a fault of
the speech, or is a fault only if one makes an implausible assumption
about how the speech is to be employed. Second, the beginning with the
end of a love affair is hardly accidental—it is certainly not the case that
Lysias composed the speech willy-nilly, taking whatever came to his mind
ﬁrst. Rather, the seemingly illogical structure is an example of feigned
artlessness.12 By seeming not to have composed the speech artfully, Lysias
artfully persuades the boy of his case. By contrast, the order of Socrates’
ﬁrst speech is so remarkable—so clear and logical—that Socrates has to
attribute its composition to divinities (263d-e).13 Plato’s Phaedrus, on the
other hand, has just such an appearance of spontaneity.
In sum, the ideal of organic unity as stated seems weak as a critical tool,
or rather, its legitimacy is called into question by the way Socrates uses it
to critique Lysias’ speech. Socrates’ criticisms seem unfair. To oversimplify
somewhat, this is so because Socrates focuses his analysis too narrowly
on the speech’s formal features and he fails to account for its soul-leading,
or psychagogic, features. This latter omission is surprising since, prior to
the discussion of the organic ideal, Socrates deﬁnes rhetoric as a “certain
guiding of the soul through words” (261a). One might be tempted to say,
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against Socrates, that Lysias’ speech is actually admirable for its formal
features, when one takes into account his intention to persuade, that is, to
guide the soul of his audience. Further, if we take Socrates’ two criticisms
seriously, then we must conclude that Socrates’ ﬁrst speech is superior to
the Palinode. Further, it would follow that written speeches, because they
are planned and their parts are mapped out ahead of time, are in general
better than conversations. These two implications are, in the context of
the Phaedrus, untenable.
III
When Phaedrus protests that Socrates is “scofﬁng at our speech” (264e),
Socrates cuts off his analysis of Lysias’ speech and claims that “Lysias’
speech does offer abundant examples which could be proﬁtably examined,
provided no one attempted to imitate them” (264e). This suggests that
Socrates has in mind to continue his critique, and, perhaps, to elaborate
on the ideal of organic unity. I attempt to reconstruct those criticisms
from two sources: Plato’s criticisms as they are implied by the parody
and Socrates’ earlier overt criticisms of the speech (234d-235b, 242d-243d).
As I will show, these prior criticisms not only anticipate those based on
the organic ideal as stated but also go much further in indicating what is
truly wrong with Lysias’ speech.
There can be little doubt that the speech of Lysias is a Platonic parody.
I claim elsewhere that parody is an imitation that distorts its target text,
author or genre, and in that distortion, one can often ﬁnd an implicit
criticism.14 Plato parodies ﬁve aspects of the speech in order to display four
parodic criticisms. These four criticisms include, but go much farther than,
the formal-structural criticisms based on the ideal of organic unity.
First, the speech consists of a set of unrelated arguments which are
strung together in a way to give the impression of spontaneity. The parody
achieves this effect through the exaggerated use of kai men dê (5 times)
and eti de (4 times) as connectives at the beginning of sentences.15 These
phrases function here as weak connectives which merely list a series of
arguments without making any logical connection amongst them.16
Second, the rhetorical effect of the speech is accomplished almost
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entirely by parallelism, through an excessive use of antithetical
grammatical structures. The speech is largely structured by men ... de
parallelism, of which there are sixteen instances. The use of men ... de is
mechanical and repetitive, contrasting lovers and non-lovers eight times,
nine counting the time the speaker contrasts lovers with himself.17 Indeed,
the speech consists primarily in the repeated assertion of the comparative
beneﬁts and harms.18 Further, as Dimock has demonstrated, the speech
also parodies Lysias’ use of alla, in particular his use of eliminative alla, (i.e.
ou ... alla: ‘not this … but this’).19 The speech contains seventeen instances
(compared to only 6 in Socrates’ speech), and there are six in succession
near the end of the speech (233e5-234b1).
Third, to the extent that there are arguments, the speech uses, indeed
overuses, arguments from ‘plausibility’—in two Stephanus pages, we
ﬁnd four uses of eikos and cognates. The parody of eikos arguments here
is likely directed at sophistic rhetoric in general and not necessarily at
Lysias in particular.20 Later, Socrates discusses the ‘Plausible Argument’
in detail, making it central to the rhetorical art as a whole, and castigating
it as an enemy of truth and, in the end, “nothing other than the opinion
of the masses” (273b).
Fourth, the speech is impersonal in the extreme, which might be ﬁne
for a piece of political rhetoric, but seems offensive in a speech requesting
“something so precious” as sexual favors (231d). Both the speaker and the
addresses remain totally anonymous. While the speaker uses the second
person singular to refer to the boy, he never addresses the beloved in the
vocative.21 Nor does the non-lover give any special reason why he has
chosen this boy instead of that. In fact, since such considerations might
suggest personal affection, i.e. love, they are ruled out by the premise
of the speech. Nor again does he give an adequate reason why the boy
should choose the speaker over any other non-lover, except paradoxically
by relying on an argument that makes the non-lover parallel to the lover
(234b-c).
Last, the speech subtly calls attention to itself precisely as written. The
use of antithetical turns of phrase suggests prior composition. Most of
all, the written character of the speech is most clear from the last words
Literature & Aesthetics 19 (1) June 2009, page 161

Putting Unity in Its Place: Organic Unity in Plato’s Phaedrus

of the speech: “just ask” (234c). The speech requests questions from its
audience, almost as a kind of challenge. The speaker does not really think
it necessary for anyone to take up this challenge, as he believes that his
words are already “sufﬁcient” (234c).
To summarize, the parody asserts four general criticisms of Lysias’
speech. First, it is poorly organized. Second, in its overreliance on stylistic
phrasing and the ‘Plausible Argument,’ it reveals an indifference to the
truth, that is, the speaker shows no erôs for truth. The speech contains
almost only “stylistic elaboration” and very little—if any—actual analysis
of the topic.22 Such stylistic elaboration gives the speech impressivesounding phrases which may very well impress, and thus, persuade,
an uncritical audience. Third, the speech reveals an indifference to its
audience, that is, the speaker shows no erôs for his interlocutor. In this
sense, the speech enacts its basic assumption, or put another way, the
speech’s basic assumption comes in for parodic criticism. Last, the speech
cannot, because written, live up to its promise to respond to the boy’s—or
anybody’s—questions.
IV
Socrates’ prior criticisms of Lysias’ speech can be divided into two
groups: those which immediately follow the speech (234d-236b) and those
which immediately follow Socrates’ own non-lover speech (242b-243d).
Note that Socrates’ ﬁrst speech is immune to, indeed is composed as a
remedy for, the ﬁrst set of criticisms, but it is targeted, along with Lysias’
speech, in the second set of criticisms. The ﬁrst set is fairly superﬁcial,
but instructively so, since the criticisms overlap with those based on the
ideal of organic unity.
Socrates ﬁrst articulates three overlapping criticisms, which focus
on the style and organization of the speech. When Phaedrus raises the
question of the adequacy of the speech’s treatment of its topic, Socrates
replies, “I was only thinking of its rhetoric” (235a). On this score, Socrates
accuses the speech of being (1) repetitive; (2) lacking depth; and (3)
showing off. The entire speech is a series of slight variations on the same
men ... de claim: Lovers cause harm, while non-lovers only beneﬁt. The
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use of eliminative alla is “uneconomical,” a way to say “the same thing
twice, as it were, once negatively and once positively.”23 Clearly, a speech
which relies so heavily on these grammatical turns of phrase is going to
lack depth. The lack of depth is also shown by the preponderance of
kai men dê and eti de in introducing new points. With so many new and
logically unrelated points, there is no deﬁnition and no real analysis, i.e.
no organic unity. Lysias’ “youthful swagger” consists in his showing off
his facility with rhetorical phrasing, by repackaging the same points in
different ways. Socrates ironically praises the speech because “each of its
phrases was clear, compact and well-turned” (235a); the irony comes not
from an implied denial that the phrases were in the end well-done but
rather from an implied denial of the idea that the accumulation of such
well-turned phrases makes a speech well-done. Socrates goes on to say
the main problem with the speech is the “arrangement (tên diathesin)”
of the arguments (236a4). In short, Socrates ﬁrst set of criticisms seems
clearly to be focused on the lack of a deﬁnition and analysis, that is, the
lack of organic unity.
After Socrates gives his own speech, with his head covered, he is stopped
from walking away from Phaedrus by his daimonic sign, and realizing his
“offense,” he decides to repent his speech and make another one in its
place (241e-242d). Here he supplies a new set of criticisms, which ﬁnd
fault with both Lysias’ speech and Socrates non-lover speech for the same
reasons. These reasons reﬂect some of the more serious parodic criticisms
outlined above. Both speeches are castigated as terrible (deinon) because
they were (1) foolish (euêthê) and (2) irreverent (asebê). While Socrates’
non-lover speech exceeds Lysias’ in terms of overall organization, it does
no better on these more serious grounds. The speeches are foolish, ﬁrst
of all, because they falsely characterize love. Lysias’ speech is a paignia,
that is, a playful display speech, meant to impress an audience with its
virtuoso rhetoric. Its falseness is implicitly acknowledged.24 To put the
same point differently, the speeches are foolish also because they elevate
style over truth, being “very reﬁned [and] putting on airs” in an attempt to
“win [audience] praise” (242e-243a). The speeches are foolish, second of all,
because they are intentionally deceptive. Socrates’ speech makes apparent
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what Lysias’ speech leaves implicit, that the non-lover is dissembling. Of
course, he is, in a vulgar sense, ‘in love’ with the boy; otherwise, there is
no reason why he would proposition him in the ﬁrst place.
The speeches are shameful and irreverent in that they offend against the
god, Erôs, which Socrates claims, “could not be bad in any way” (242e).
They were both ﬁt for sailors (243b) in constricting the sense of love to
base sexual desire and not even considering a nobler kind of love. Of
course, the rhetoric of the non-lover speeches would have been entirely
undermined by acknowledging a noble form of love, since such a love
would clearly be superior to the crass opportunism advocated by the
ﬁrst two speeches. The divine Erôs that Socrates restores, in his Palinode,
includes both erôs for one’s beloved and erôs for the truth. The two loves
are not extrinsic to but rather intertwined with one another, since one
exhibits one love for the beloved through one’s love for the truth, and one
exhibits one’s love for the truth in philosophical conversation with one’s
beloved. From this perspective, the two non-lover speeches are irreverent
both for failing to exhibit erôs for the truth and for failing to exhibit erôs for
the audience. This connects up with the reasons that the speeches were
foolish—their implicitly acknowledged falseness shows no love of truth
and their deceptive intention shows no love of other.25
The criticisms based on the ideal of organic unity as stated only
manage to reveal the most superﬁcial problems with the speech. These
superﬁcial objections are met by Socrates’ non-lover speech, but that
speech, along with Lysias’, comes in for more serious criticisms. The
ideal of organic unity, if it is to be made adequate, has to reﬂect these
more serious concerns. In order to do this, we need to jump forward in
the Phaedrus to the last two sections, on psychagogia (271c-274b) and on
writing (274b-278b).
V
I hope to have shown so far that the organic ideal as stated is inadequate
and intentionally so. I will now attempt to restate the organic ideal as
implied by a close reading of the last half of the dialogue. Three main
questions drive the second half: How does one write well or poorly? Is
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rhetoric a technê? How does one properly organize a speech? The question
about organization (which the principle of organic unity answers) must be
understood in the context of the question of whether rhetoric is a technê,
and that question must be understood in the context of good writing more
generally. Thus, I propose to rewrite the principle of organic unity by
placing it within the larger context of good writing in general. To remind,
the ideal as stated run as follows:
[OU]
A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a compelling
logic of composition which begins with an accurate deﬁnition and proceeds
to analyze the topic according to its nature and it is written by someone
with dialectical knowledge of the topic.

In order to make my reasoning in this section maximally clear, I will
amend the ideal in three stages, each time drawing from an argument in
the text in order to build up the ideal as implied. Central to this task will
be the restoration of the soul to the living organism of the written speech,
and that will force upon it a teleological structure. The teleological structure
is twofold: ﬁrst, the telos of the written speech is the effect it has on the
souls of its human audience; second, the telos of human being either simply
is, or is best achieved through, the possession of knowledge.26 Success
for a written speech is thus intimately linked to the facilitation of success
for a human being.
After Socrates has established dialectical knowledge as necessary for
the rhetorician, Phaedrus still insists that “the rhetorical part has escaped”
(266c). Phaedrus is right about this: though they had earlier deﬁned
rhetoric as “a certain guiding of souls (psychagôgia) through words, not
only in the law courts and other places of public assembly but also in
private” (261a), this relationship to an audience is left implicit in the
organic ideal as stated. In fact, while Socrates insists that anything done
well requires the dialectical method, he does not deny that some part of
the rhetorical art has been omitted (266d). After a digression on technical
terms from the rhetorical handbooks,27 Socrates explicitly introduces, or
rather reintroduces, the soul into the discussion as something necessary
for the art of rhetoric which the rhetorical handbooks leave out (271c).
Speeches are composed in order to have a certain persuasive effect on
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the souls of its audience. This teleological framework is implied but left
implicit in the organic ideal as stated.
In order to guide the souls of one’s audience successfully, one needs
knowledge of the soul and its different types. To achieve this, the speechwriter will need to “demonstrate the essence of the nature” of the soul
(270e). He will have to “describe the soul with full precision (pasêi
akribeiai)” (271a). The procedure for this task, as with that for speaking
about “the nature of anything whatsoever,” involves asking whether
“a nature is simple or multi-formed … . [I]f simple, we should consider
its natural capacity … . If it has multiple forms, we must count these
and examine each of them” (270c-d). The discussion proceeds, without
arguing for it, as though the soul were indeed multi-formed.28 This is not
surprising given the elaborate account of the different kinds of soul in the
Palinode. Since different types of souls are affected in different ways by
different types of speeches, the orator must be able to match the forms of
soul to the forms of speech. He does this in order to be able “to explain
sufﬁciently what type of person is persuaded by what type of speech” and
“to perceive and to determine for himself in the case of an individual he
meets that he is this type of person” (271e-272a).29 These considerations
force both a teleological framework on the principle as a whole and an
alteration in the description of the speech-writer, since he needs to know
something beyond his topic:
[OU2]
A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a compelling
logic of composition which begins with an accurate deﬁnition and proceeds
to analyze the topic according to its nature and it is written by someone
with dialectical knowledge both of the topic and of the soul in order to
lead the souls of the readers in the way that the author desires.

This amendment is crucial, since the role of the audience is restored
to its central place in the goal, or telos, of the composition of speeches.30
Organic unity is no longer its own end, but rather serves the further
purpose of persuasive effect on its audience. The author now stands in
a relationship to his audience, and this seems to be ‘the rhetorical part’
that Phaedrus found lacking.
Some difﬁculties still remain. When Socrates ﬁrst describes rhetoric as
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psychagôgia, a ‘leading of the soul,’ he leaves its ambiguous connotations
intact. The term carried the implications both of brain-washing through
propaganda or verbal trickery and of education, properly speaking.
As I emphasized in discussing the knowledge of the author criterion,
knowledge is initially understood as an instrumental good. So too is
‘leading the soul’ initially understood with its more nefarious implications.
Even with this new condition explicit, Socrates leaves deception open
as a possible goal of leading the soul. Notice that there is no mention of
truth after the ‘in order to’ clause. A second problem emerges here with
more force: the distinction between speaking and writing is several times
elided. In fact, when Socrates speaks of identifying the one you meet on
the street as possessing a certain type of soul, he certainly seems no longer
to be speaking of written discourse.
After Socrates sets the knowledge bar extremely high for the
achievement of the art of rhetoric, Phaedrus, in a severe understatement,
remarks, “this seems to be no small undertaking” (272b).31 In response,
Socrates examines “an easier and more concise path,” thereby setting
truth and plausibility in direct opposition (272c). Plausibility resembles
the truth, and draws its power from this resemblance (273d). The more
difﬁcult and circuitous path insists on the truth, whereas the pursuit of
plausibility causes one to “bid the truth a hearty farewell” (272e). He
gives the example, supposedly from the rhetorical handbook of Tisias,
of a small, brave man who assaults a big, cowardly one. The small man
should insist that he could not possibly have assaulted such a large man,
and the large man should insist that the small man had help from others.
Neither should tell the truth, since no one would believe it. The argument
from plausibility, thus, depends on, appeals to and indeed strengthens the
“opinion of the masses” at the expense of the truth (273b).
Socrates insists that one should appeal to and gratify the gods, rather
than one’s “fellow slaves,” since the gods are “masters who are good
and from good stock” (274a). One should gratify one’s fellow slaves
“in a secondary way,” presumably by persuading them of the truth, and
not merely by leading their souls wherever one wishes. In other words,
persuading the audience of the truth must be the genuine goal of a written
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speech and thus it must be added to the principle of organic unity:

[OU3]
A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a compelling
logic of composition which begins with an accurate deﬁnition and proceeds
to analyze the topic according to its nature and it is written by someone
with dialectical knowledge both of the topic and of the soul in order to lead
the souls of the readers toward the truth.

The reference to ‘truth’ in the ‘in order to’ clause closes off the
possibility of deception being a goal of the organically written speech.
What is implied by this is a caring, or at minimum beneﬁcent, attitude
toward one’s audience. The nature of the relationship between author
and audience is now clearer: it is that of an educator to a student. The
educator, in leading his student toward the truth, displays erôs toward
him or her.
From the earliest passages in the second half of the dialogue, Socrates
conﬂates speaking and writing. It is only at the end that he ﬁnally and
wholly answers the question of what makes a written speech well done by
telling and analyzing a myth about writing “heard from our ancestors”
(274c). This confounding of the two is not accidental, as we shall see, since
writing well—in the most general sense—is intimately related to speaking
well. In discussing this last section of the dialogue on writing,32 I hope
to make the teleological structure of the principle clearer by clarifying
the intended audience of written texts, the manner in which they affect
their readers, and their proper style. While initially critical of writing, the
account does leave writing a positive role.
The ﬁrst criticisms of writing are those of the divine King Thamus, who
rebukes the technician god Theuth for “not speak[ing] beautifully” about
his invention of writing (274eff.). While Theuth claims to have discovered
a “drug for memory and wisdom”, Thamus counters that the former has
described “the opposite of their real effect” (274e-275a). First, writing
will “produce a forgetting in the souls of those who learn letters,” rather
than memory, since those who trust writing will rely on it as a “reminder”
and deem living memory superﬂuous (275a). Second, writing offers its
students “an apparent, not a true wisdom”; students and readers “appear
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rich in knowledge when for the most part there’s an absence of knowledge,
and they will appear wise rather than being wise” (275a-b). To put this
second point more forcefully, instead of producing wisdom, writing will
produce the worst kind of ignorance: self-ignorance.33
When Phaedrus responds to this myth by playfully mocking Socrates
for his ability to construct fables, Socrates rebukes him for caring about
the source of claims rather than their truth. Whereas Phaedrus blithely
assents to Thamus’ assessment, Socrates proceeds to analyze the criticisms.
The king’s criticisms do not leave any space for good writing, but Socrates’
four-part assessment and critique of the king’s criticisms do.
First, Socrates explains why writing can engender self-ignorance
without saying that it necessarily does. Writings enshrine particular
formulations which have the appearance of clear knowledge. Someone
believing that there will be “something clear and secure in these written
forms” is “exceedingly simple-minded” (275c); in possession of these, he
might think himself wise when he is not.34
Second, Socrates ﬁnds a positive role for reminders. By saying that
“written speeches are [nothing] more than reminders for a person already
in the know” (275d), he departs from Thamus’ assessment, since, for the
latter, being a reminder was positively detrimental to knowledge and
memory. On Socrates’ account, though one cannot acquire new knowledge
from writings—one cannot learn from them—they can serve as reminders
for those who already know. This positive function for reminding echoes
the Palinode, where Socrates has claimed that the correct use of reminders
(hupomnasin) allows one to recollect (anamnêsis) what one’s soul once saw
in the hyperuranium circuit (249c).
Third, Socrates articulates additional criticisms, ones not mentioned
by Thamus, based on an analogy with painting. Writing’s creations, like
those of a painting, “stand there as if alive, but if you question them, they
remain in complete and solemn silence” (275d). Written texts are neither
responsive nor interactive—one cannot engage them in a dialogue. On
the other hand, a written text can be used for any purpose, even by “those
who have no business reading it,” since a written text cannot discern “to
whom it should speak and to whom it shouldn’t” (275d-e). A written
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speech is “unable by itself to defend or help itself” and thus “always
needs the help of its father” (275e). These are serious criticisms, and they
threaten to close off the space that Socrates made for good writing. The
incentive for reader to read and for author to write seems to dissipate
under the weight of these claims. If in reading, all one acquires is a bad
interlocutor, one who speaks but neither listens nor responds, then one
has little reason to read. If, in writing, all one achieves is the possibility
of having one’s claims twisted by uncomprehending readers, then one
has little incentive to write.
Fourth, Socrates introduces “a legitimate brother” to written speech and
places written speech in the context of and in relation to spoken speech.
This legitimate brother is “by nature better and more capable” in that it can
“defend itself” and “knows when and to whom it should speak” (276a).
Socrates identiﬁes this brother as what “is written with knowledge in the
soul of one who understands,” and Phaedrus clariﬁes that this is “the
speech of a person who knows, a speech living and ensouled, the written
version of which would justly be called an image” (276a).35 The model,
or ideal, seems to be the speech of the knowledgeable dialectician, the
only one qualiﬁed to write in the ﬁrst place (see above), and his writings
are an image of his own dialectical conversations. Clearly, part of the
point here is that living dialectic is superior to writing. But it is equally
clear that Socrates overtly recognizes a legitimate use for writing. If the
knowledgeable dialectician writes, he will do so “in the joy of play,”
building up a “treasure trove of reminders both for himself … and for all
those who walk down the same path and he’ll take pleasure watching the
tender shoots in the garden grow” (276d). He repeats this criterion a bit
later, restricting an author’s readers to “men who know” (278a). Thus, to
remedy the difﬁculty posed by an uncomprehending general readership,
Socrates restricts the scope of the legitimate audience to knowers including
but not limited to the author himself.
Given these considerations, we might reformulate the principle of
organic unity as follows:
[OU4] A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a compelling
logic of composition which begins with an accurate deﬁnition and proceeds
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to analyze the topic according to its nature and it is playfully written by
someone with dialectical knowledge both of the topic and of the soul and
it is an image of his own living, ensouled discourse, i.e. dialectic, in
order to lead the souls of knowers back toward the truth. It achieves this
by functioning as a reminder of one’s already obtained dialectical
knowledge (i.e., what is ‘written in the soul’).36

This is an advance on the earlier deﬁnition in several important ways.
First and foremost, it recognizes the priority relationship between living
dialectic and writing. Second, knowledge is recognized as the proper
goal of man, and thus the proper goal of writing. Third, it elaborates on
the function of writing by specifying a more particular audience, that of
knowers, and by articulating the manner of its soul-leading, i.e. reminding.
Fourth, it implies the playful intention of the author since he will not take
his own writings very seriously in the ﬁrst place. Fourth, it implies a
criterion of style: since writing is properly an image of living dialectic, it
can best achieve its task through the portrayal of living dialectic. Since the
knowers presumably arrived at the same knowledge through dialectical
inquiry, presumably they can be best reminded of it through an image of
dialectical inquiry. A long speech, though not ruled out, would be less
ideal.
There are also several problems with this reformulation of the principle.
First, we are left with a picture of writing, in which it properly operates
only within an elitist, closed system. Writing is either inherently private,
only functioning as a reminder for the author himself, or inherently
uninformative, only functioning for the elite group of knowers already
possessing the dialectical knowledge. In either case, no souls are led
anywhere they haven’t already been and the educative function of writing
seems entirely undermined. The dialogue seemingly established between
author and reader is lost. Second, and related, the discussion of the
artfulness of rhetoric seems now to have been irrelevant to the goodness
of writing. Socrates reiterates the conclusions of that discussion (277b-c),
emphasizing once again the necessity of dialectical knowledge of both the
topic and the soul, if speeches, both spoken and written, are to teach or
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persuade. But, on this view, writing is not able to teach or persuade at all.
Therefore, it cannot be done artfully. Third, Socrates has all along been
attempting to generate in Phaedrus a critical attitude toward writing, that
is, an attitude which entails that one critically examines a text. However,
if one sees written texts as reminders for those who know, one might be
tempted to think oneself wise, and either see in a piece of writing what
one already thinks one knows, or dismiss it as false. Finally, this model
conceives of knowledge as straightforwardly attainable and transmittable
through oral dialectic, though this seems in contradiction with the account
of human nature as erotic in the Palinode. 37 The required knowledge of
the soul, for example, is there restricted to the gods, while humans can
only describes what the soul is like (246a). To this issue, I now turn.
VI
At one point, Socrates explicitly acknowledges that the bar for good
writing is set extremely high. When Phaedrus sums up his impression of
Socrates’ account, he says, “That’s said very beautifully, it seems to me,
Socrates, if only anyone could do it”; in reply, Socrates claims, “And yet
even in reaching for the beautiful there is beauty, and also in suffering what
one suffers en route” (274a-b). To reﬂect this striving for the beautiful in
the principle of organic unity requires acknowledging the erotic nature of
man’s relationship to knowledge as articulated in the Palinode. There are
clear parallels here to the Palinode itself. Recall that beauty is precisely
the element in which the philosopher most clearly has his vision of the
form. So too does the talk of gratifying the gods (274b) reintroduce the
divine—so prominent in the Palinode—into the discussion. The mention
of the gods’ “good stock” hearkens back to the description of the soul’s
good horse (246a8).38 In addition, the description of philosophical
education in terms of nourishment and procreation has “erotic overtones”
and is reminiscent of the Palinode.39 We must, of course, tread carefully
here: what is ‘true’ and what ‘false’ in the Palinode is not obvious, though
Socrates is convinced that some parts of it are in fact true (265b-c). Even
on the most austere, minimalist reading of the Palinode, human nature
strives for, but does not achieve, divine wisdom—not even when the soul
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is detached from the body does it attain a full view of the beings in the
hyperuranian realm (248a-e). In the myth, certain souls do attain a partial
view of the forms, but what they see and for how long depends on whose
train they are in and how they lived their previous lives.
I propose to reformulate the principle of organic unity in order to
acknowledge the erotic nature of man. I will do so in two stages, for
clarity’s sake, by inserting uncertainty into the deﬁnition in the places
where full and complete knowledge are assumed. First, I will formulate an
alternative to [OU3] above, by acknowledging uncertainty in four places:
ﬁrst, the possessor of dialectical knowledge becomes a seeker of dialectical
knowledge, i.e. a philosopher; second, the accurate deﬁnition and analysis
becomes desired rather than completed, third, the teleological function
of a written text cannot be guaranteed to succeed since the knowledge of
soul will not be complete; ﬁnally, what the reader will be turned toward
is not the truth but the pursuit of truth, partly alleviating the implication
of success. The resulting redeﬁnition runs thus:
[OU3*]
A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a
compelling logic of composition which seeks an accurate deﬁnition and
analysis of its topic and it is written by someone who seeks dialectical
knowledge both of the topic and of the soul, i.e. a philosopher, in order to
attempt to lead the souls of the readers toward the pursuit of truth.

As partial confirmation of this move, we might note that when
Phaedrus asks what name to assign to the author of written speeches that
live up to the ideal, he forgoes “wise person” and instead labels him a
“lover of wisdom,” i.e. a “philosopher” (278d).40
Now I will attempt to rewrite [OU4] in such a way that acknowledges
man’s erotic nature. In addition to the above changes, I make substitutions
in three places: ﬁrst, I substitute ‘philosophers’ for ‘knowers’ as the
intended audience; second, the reminding is attempted rather than
achieved; third, what one is reminded of is not fully achieved dialectical
knowledge, but the partial vision of the disembodied soul. The resulting
redeﬁnition runs thus:
[OU4*]
A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a
compelling logic of composition which seeks an accurate deﬁnition and
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analysis of its topic and it is playfully written by someone who seeks
dialectical knowledge both of the topic and of the soul, i.e. a philosopher,
and it is a image of his own living, ensouled discourse, i.e. dialectic, in order
to attempt to lead the souls of philosophers toward the pursuit of truth.
It attempts this by functioning as a reminder of the soul’s previously
attained knowledge (i.e., what is written in the soul).

It will be useful to see how this reformulation deals with the objections
leveled above against [OU4]. First, this principle seems no longer as
open to the charge that writing belongs only to a closed elitist system. In
one sense, it is still elitist—the intended audience now is philosophers
instead of knowers. However, the system is more open in the sense that
being a philosopher is not, like being a knower, a settled matter. If one
responds to a writing in a philosophical way, then one is in fact one of
those to whom the writing is addressed; if not, not. In other words, the
‘discrimination’ is self-selecting and if one is persuaded by a text that one
would like to be a philosopher, then, in some sense, one in fact already is.
On this account, dialectic is not a completed achievement, but a process
of investigation. The conception of writing is also still in part elitist, as it
does claim that good writing will be able to provoke a true insight. These
true insights are arguably open only to those whose souls were relatively
unencumbered in their circuit around the heavens. But again the matter is
not settled ahead of time—by gaining an insight into the matter at hand,
you thereby show yourself to have been, in the Palinode’s terms, in the
train of Zeus in the ﬁrst place.41 This account shows good writing to be
provocative of philosophical inquiry in its readers, turning their souls
toward the pursuit of truth.
Second, on this account, writing can function as a tool for teaching
and persuading, and thus can be done artfully. What a text can persuade
of, ﬁrst of all, is the need to engage in philosophical inquiry. It can do
this both by provoking an insight into a given topic and by providing a
model of critical inquiry—of dialectic—for emulation. What we can learn
through the written text will not be a set of doctrines or claims. Rather,
we can learn through our own philosophical engagement with the text.
In this sense, what we learn will be both taught and self-taught. The
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dialogue between author and reader, lost in the formulation of [OU4],
remains here. In addition, the model of oral dialectic, which consisted in
the more or less straightforward transmission of knowledge from knower
to learner, is more questioning and unﬁnished, and knowledge remains
as its extremely difﬁcult ideal goal. A written speech becomes more like
a human being than a tree, which Socrates claims has nothing to teach
him (230d). Third, and related, the critical attitude that Socrates takes
toward the written speeches within the dialogue and that attitude which
he attempts to instill in Phaedrus is clearly the kind of attitude that this
model encourages for someone approaching a written text. One cannot
be certain enough of the author’s knowledge or of one’s own to accept
or reject a text out of hand for failing or succeeding to remind one of
one’s already obtained knowledge. One must put questions to the text
to ﬁnd out whether it leads somewhere philosophically fruitful. To put
the point differently, the success of a written speech is, in the end, up to
us, its readers.
VII
As a ﬁnal test of the preferability of [OU4*] to [OU4], I want to turn
to the Phaedrus itself to see how these principles fare in assessing both
the possible purpose of the Phaedrus—its telos—as a written work and its
much-debated unity. The former is a more important test, in my view,
since the reconstruction of the principle of organic unity has shown, if
anything, that the arrangement of parts, though not inconsequential, is
not the best standard by which to assess a written work.
If Plato were committed to [OU4], then his writing and publishing of
the Phaedrus is somewhat puzzling. We might express this as a dilemma:
either Plato thought he possessed dialectical knowledge of the dialogue’s
topic (intentionally left indeterminate here) and the soul, and he wrote
the Phaedrus only for himself and his students in the Academy (i.e. those
who have walked along the same dialectical path), in which case the
rest of us probably have no business reading it; or Plato did not think he
possessed the relevant dialectical knowledge, in which case his writing
the Phaedrus is a performative contradiction. Against the second horn,
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it seems clear that Plato could hardly have been unaware of the high
standard he was setting for a written text since he calls attention to it in
the dialogue (discussed above). Against the ﬁrst horn, the Phaedrus clearly
fails to represent a successful dialectical conversation—it does not depict
a dialogue that begins with a deﬁnition and proceeds to analyze the topic.
Nor does it seem to have a uniﬁed topic in the requisite sense. So Plato
either misunderstood or misapplied his own criteria; both are, of course,
possible, but both also seem to make the dialogue, in an important sense,
incoherent or self-undermining.42
If Plato were committed to [OU4*], however, his writing and publishing
of the Phaedrus does make sense. On this view, Plato writes the Phaedrus
as a reminder for its readers to engage in philosophical inquiry.43 This
makes Plato’s intention with respect to his readership parallel to that of
Socrates with respect to his interlocutors. Both intend to turn the souls
of their audiences toward philosophy, to generate in them a true insight
into the nature of the topic at hand and, thus, to make them active in the
pursuit of wisdom through dialectical conversation. It is the establishment
of a kind of dialogue between author and reader. This modest goal seems
not to require going beyond the limitations of writing. This dialogue may
begin the kind of cycle of oral dialectic that Socrates describes as continuing
to “pass this seed on, forever immortal” (277a). If the author of these
speeches is properly a philosopher, as Socrates insists he should be called
(278d), then success is measured by the number of critical responses and
discussions that is has provoked in other philosophers. By this measure,
the Phaedrus is an exceedingly successful written work.
I think I have shown that organic unity is not an end in itself, since
the true measure of a written work lies not in the organization of its parts
but in the souls of its audience. In one sense, this paper is an attempt
at making organic unity a central concern of the Phaedrus, and this is
shown to be an impossible task. So, an excessive focus on the unity (or
not) of the Phaedrus is misguided.44 On the other hand, the principle
of organic unity (on either the [OU4] or [OU4*] formulation) shows that
Plato considered organic unity a desideratum, and that he likely thought
the Phaedrus uniﬁed. The question is, does [OU4] or [OU4*] better reﬂect
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the kind of unity the dialogue has? I will approach this question through
two puzzles: What exactly is main topic of the Phaedrus? How could the
Phaedrus be an instance of an organically uniﬁed work if it contains the
parody of Lysias, an example of a poorly uniﬁed work? [OU4*] gives more
adequate answers than [OU4] with respect to both puzzles.
The kind of unity demanded by [OU4] is more rigid than that of [OU4*],
in part because the model of oral dialectic associated with [OU4*] is more
ﬂuid that associated with [OU4]. [OU4] assumes that a written work both
represents and reminds its audience of the successful dialectical analysis
of a single topic.45 Though dialectical analyses are certainly present,
the Phaedrus is clearly not organized around a single topic or theme.46
There are, as many have point out, several topics or themes that hold the
dialogue together: erôs, rhetoric, the soul, self-knowledge, philosophy, etc.
On [OU4], we seem to need to make a choice, but each choice must ignore
evidence for the other possibilities. By contrast, [OU4*] is more ﬂexible,
since it makes a written work representative of a dialectical analysis
that was not necessarily successful. If one seeks rather than achieves
a dialectical analysis of one’s intended topic, then, like in an ordinary
conversation, one will perhaps move from the initial topic to a related one.
This is to deny that organic unity entails unity of theme or topic. These
reﬂections perhaps even warrant a small amendment to [OU4*], changing
“the topic” to “the topic(s)”.
The speech of Lysias, which not only lacks organic unity but is foolish
and irreverent as well, also seems out of place given [OU4]’s more rigid
conception of unity. It is strange that Plato would include it in an avowedly
organically uniﬁed work, since it seems to undermine any claim the
dialogue has to organic unity: it is not a dialectical analysis, it purports
to be written by someone without knowledge, and it is intentionally
deceptive. In addition, though Socrates admits that the speech is not
entirely false, it’s hard to see how successful oral dialectic requires the
inclusion of false or misleading claims about erôs, or how exposure to
such claims will remind one of the truth. On [OU4*], however, Plato’s goal
is the generation of true insight(s) and the provocation of philosophical
inquiry. A false and poorly uniﬁed speech might, to someone already
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interested in speeches, be used to provoke a philosophical response, as
Socrates does with Phaedrus.47 For one who already knows, by contrast,
this seems a perverse strategy. Plato’s fourth century readers were more
likely to be interested in rhetorical speeches than, for example, his students
in the Academy. To be successful in rhetoric, both the principle of organic
unity and the dialogue as a whole show, requires knowledge. To acquire
knowledge requires endeavoring to pursuit it, i.e. doing philosophy.48
The conclusion that one should pursue knowledge is not only
repeatedly argued for, but the structure of the dialogue leads one, step
by step through its seemingly disparate parts, to this conclusion. I can
only brieﬂy sketch the dialectical or palinodic progression I have in mind
here.49 As we saw, Socrates’ non-lover speech, while surpassing Lysias’ in
unity and organization, was still committed to a one-sided account of erôs
and thus did not exceed it in truth. So Socrates literally takes that speech
back and offers the Palinode in its place, with its grand vision of a noble
form of erôs. While the Palinode was clearly more adequate with respect
to erôs, it does not enact one of the core teachings of that speech. Socrates
is giving a long speech to Phaedrus and not investigating along with him,
as the Palinode recommends. After the Palinode, Socrates does engage in
a dialectical inquiry with Phaedrus into the nature of rhetorical speeches,
thus enacting the model of education articulated in the Palinode. But that
dialectic calls attention to itself as written by highlighting the distinction
between writing and speaking, thereby revealing the limitations of the
written work of the Phaedrus. We are thus encouraged to respond to the
written Phaedrus in the way that Socrates responds to the myth of Theuth
and Thamus, that is, by analyzing, assessing, and criticizing it to see where
its truth lies. To do this is already to begin to do philosophy.
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A Reply to Heath”, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 7 (1989), pp. 175-88; Daniel Werner,
“Plato’s Phaedrus and the Problem of Unity”, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 32 (2007), pp.
91-137.
Except where noted, all translations are from Stephen Scully, Plato’s Phaedrus (Newburyport, MA:
Focus Publishing, 2003).
Because of this, Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 130, claims that the whole section (263d-266d) is “of
relatively small importance.”
Socrates articulates the knowledge of the author as a precondition for a good speech even before
he asserts the organic ideal. He claims that beautiful speech depends on the prior possession
of “a discursive understanding (dianoian) of the truth about the subject” (259e). When ‘Lady
Rhetoric’ chastises Socrates and Phaedrus, she says that one should “master the truth and then
take me up” (260d).
There is a translation issue here: Rowe takes the phrase to mean ‘after the lover is done with his
speech,’ rather than ‘with his love.’ The Greek here is ambiguous, but if we take it in the ﬁrst
way, then it’s not clear what aspect of the second element Socrates is faulting. See Rowe, Plato:
Phaedrus, p. 99.
Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 31, for example, regards the speech as hardly worth attention: “This
tedious piece of rhetoric deserves little comment”.
Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, pp. 47-55, claims that Socrates’ criticisms “border on the crass.”
See Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, pp. 49-55, 88-95.
On Lysias’ use of ordinary language, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, “Lysias”, in The Critical
Essays: Vol. I, transl. Stephen Usher, in The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press, 1974), §2.
See Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, p. 49; C. Carey, ed., Lysias: Selected Speeches, in Cambridge Greek
and Latin Classics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 8.
Socrates’ ﬁrst speech proceeds systematically: he begins with an account of the nature of love
(237a-238c), proceeds with an characterization of the lover and the kind of beloved he desires
(238d-239a), clariﬁes how the lover the harms the beloved, sorting out harm to boy’s soul (239ac), harm to his body (239c-d), and harm to his property (239d-240a), gives an account of why
it might seem pleasant to take a lover (240a-d), enumerates the unpleasant experiences of the
beloved (240d-e), describes the end of the affair (240e-241b), and ﬁnishes up with a summary
(241b-d). Notice that Socrates places the end of the affair at the end of his speech where it belongs
according to the logic of his speech.
On Plato’s use of parody, see Franco Trivigno, “The Rhetoric of Parody in Plato’s Menexenus,” in
Philosophy and Rhetoric, 42 (2009),pp. 29-58. Since it is not essential to my argument here, I will not
be analyzing Lysias’ work in order to assess the justness of the parody.
See Paul Shorey, “On the Erotikos of Lysias in Plato’s Phaedrus,” in Classical Philology, 28 (1933),
pp. 131-132; George E. Dimock, “Alla in Lysias and Plato’s Phaedrus”, in The American Journal of
Philology, 73 (1952), pp. 381-396.
On kai men dê, see J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), pp. 395-7;
on eti de, see Denniston, The Greek Particles, pp. 162-3; Henry Liddell and Robert Scott, A GreekEnglish Lexicon, ed. Henry Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 703. Scully’s translation
represents the disjointed effect very well by translating the former as “And another thing” and
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the latter as “Besides,” and beginning a new paragraph each time one occurs: Scully, Plato’s
Phaedrus, pp. 7-11.
On contrasting versus non-contrasting use of men ... de, see Denniston, The Greek Particles, pp. 36970.
Compare Socrates’ ﬁrst speech, which uses men ... de almost as often—fourteen times—but never
to contrast lovers and non-lovers or to contrast the same things twice.
Dimock, “Alla in Lysias and Plato’s Phaedrus,” pp. 292-4; Denniston, The Greek Particles, pp. 1-3.
That said, Dionysius, “Lysias,” §19, praises Lysias for being particularly good at probability
arguments.
See Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 46. By contrast, Socrates invents a story about
a man in love trying to convince his beloved that he is not in love, and this secret lover does
address the boy in the vocative, twice as “my darling boy” (237b, 241c). Indeed, it is as though
the true addressee of the speech is Phaedrus himself: see the ﬂirtatious double entendre of 243e.
Dimock, “Alla in Lysias and Plato’s Phaedrus,” pp. 393-4.
Dimock, “Alla in Lysias and Plato’s Phaedrus,” pp. 384-5. Compare: Socrates’ ﬁrst speech, which
focuses only on the lover, causes Phaedrus to complain that Socrates is only half-way done, to
which Socrates replies, “whatever we’ve said in reproach of the one, the opposite holds true of the
other—all good things. Why make a long speech of it?” (241e).
See Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, p. 51. Perhaps the most famous rhetorical set-piece is Gorgias’
Encomium to Helen. R. G. Tanner, “Plato’s Phaedrus: An Educational Manifesto?” in Understanding
the Phaedrus, ed. Livio Rossetti (Sankt Augustin: Academia, 1992), pp. 218-221, ﬁnds clear
allusions to this text in the Phaedrus.
Socrates’ ‘non-lover’ is in love with the boy, but in intentionally deceiving him, he fails to
demonstrate adequate care.
I will bracket, for the sake of this argument, the complicated questions of the relationship between
knowledge and eudaimonia, and of that between knowledge and virtue. It seems clear, however,
both in terms of the Phaedrus itself and for Plato’s philosophy more generally, that knowledge and
human ﬂourishing are intimately linked.
Phaedrus speculates that the technical terms from the rhetorical handbooks might indicate what
has been left out, and Socrates ironically praises him for it (267d). However, Socrates then shows
these only to be “prerequisites” which stand in need of proper arrangement (268a-270d). Cp.
Isocrates, “Against the Sophists,” in Isocrates: Vol. II, transl. George Norlin, in The Loeb Classical
Library (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), §§16-18. de Vries, A Commentary on the
Phaedrus of Plato, p.15-18, sees many allusions to Isocrates throughout the dialogue.
Cp. Socrates’ earlier reﬂections on self-knowledge, where he claims that he is “still not able to
‘know [him]self,’ as the Delphic inscription enjoins” and wonders whether he “happens to be
some sort of beast even more complex in form and more tumultuous than the hundred-headed
Typhon, or whether [he is] something simpler and gentler, having a share by nature of the divine
and the unTyphonic” (229e-230a). This passage is important for Griswold’s interpretation: see
Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, pp. 36-44.
Socrates talks here of knowing the “appropriate time” (272a). Cp. Isocrates, “Against the
Sophists,” §12.
In emphasizing the function of speeches, my account of unity is similar to that expressed by
Heath, “The Unity of the Phaedrus,” p. 163. Heath’s argument relies too heavily on cultural
considerations and not enough on the text of the Phaedrus: see Werner, “Plato’s Phaedrus and the
Problem of Unity,” p. 125-7. My own argument is not open to this charge.
Based on a close analysis of Socrates’ praise of Pericles at 269e-270a, Brisson, “L’Unité du Phèdre
de Platon: Rhétorique et Philosophie dans le Phèdre,” pp. 61-76, argues that the knowledge of the
whole of nature is required, thus setting the bar for rhetoric even higher.
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This section of the dialogue has generated much scholarly interest, and I will not be able to do
it full justice here. However, I do think that the attention it has gotten has too often ignored
or downplayed the larger context, and my discussion might serve as a counterbalance: see
e.g. Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy” in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London:
Continuum International, 2004), pp. 67-186.
See Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, pp. 205-6.
As Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 212, puts it, the danger that writing poses is
precisely that it “will not adequately induce self-questioning in its readers.”
It is possible that Phaedrus is here drawing on what he has read from Alcidamas, the orator
and rival of Isocrates, who explicitly compared written to spoken speeches in this way. See
Alcidamas, On the Sophists §§27-28, in J. V. Muir, Alcidamas: The Works and Fragments (London:
Bristol Classical Press, 2001). He claims that written speeches “should be thought of as images
and patterns and imitations of speeches”, that they are like statues and depiction of animals, that
they are “ﬁxedly unable to respond to critical moments” and that “speech spoken on the spur of
the moment has a soul in it and is alive.” According to Muir, Alcidamas, xi-xii, he was concerned
with “establishing real audience contact” through “the appearance of direct, spontaneous
communication” based on the premise that “‘live’ responsive communication and a real
relationship with an audience was the most effective way of making a public speech.” It is not
clear whether Plato is drawing from Alcidamas, or vice versa. Muir, Alcidamas, p. xiv, assumes
without argument that Alcidams is responding to Plato. I see no reason to make this assumption.
This last clause is perhaps problematic, since dialectical knowledge is arguably not equivalent to
what is ‘written in the soul.’ One might claim that what is written in the soul is likely a noetic
vision of the truth, one similar to but more complete than that obtained in the hyperuranium
realm. Socrates explicitly says that what is written down cannot be the complete formulation,
suggesting that knowledge, properly speaking, will not be discursive in nature. Even so, then
dialectical knowledge will be an indication that one has knowledge written in the soul as well.
See Christopher Gill, “Dogmatic Dialogue in Phaedrus 276-7?” in Understanding the Phaedrus, ed.
Livio Rossetti (Sankt Augustin: Academia, 1992), pp. 156-72. Gill points out that the “dogmatic”
reasons for criticizing writing are not identical to what he calls the “skeptical” reasons outlined in
the Seventh Letter. What he fails to point out though is that the “dogmatic” reasons outlined in
this section are in fact in tension with the Palinode’s picture of human nature.
See Scully, Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 63n.138.
Werner, “Plato’s Phaedrus and the Problem of Unity,” p. 101.
One might object that I have neglected an alternative possibility here. The author might be said
to possess partial knowledge of forms, in the sense that the souls of those who follow in the train
of their god attain partial knowledge of the forms. On this objection, I need not diminish the
author’s knowledge since he possesses it prior to becoming embodied. However, this option
seems ruled out here by the fact that in both cases it is dialectical knowledge that the author is said
to possess—this sort of knowledge is surely not tantamount to the partial glimpse that the soul
achieves in its heavenly circuit.
See Rowe, “The Unity of the Phaedrus: A Reply to Heath,” p. 181.
Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, pp. 11-16, persuasively argues that the charge of
authorial incompetence should only be levied as a last resort, after the assumption of a uniﬁed
meaning has proven untenable.
On the provocation of philosophical inquiry as a unifying purpose of the dialogue, see e.g.
Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedrus, pp. 9, 136-7; Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, pp. 222-3.
Cp. the similar advice of Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, p. 232. I do not thereby consider my
view to representative of what Werner, “Plato’s Phaedrus and the Problem of Unity,” pp. 125-9,
calls the “debunking approach.” My point is not to suggest that unity should not be a concern of
Literature & Aesthetics 19 (1) June 2009, page 181

Putting Unity in Its Place: Organic Unity in Plato’s Phaedrus

45

46

47
48
49

the interpreter, but rather that an excessive focus on unity will cause one to miss the philosophical
point entirely.
Gill, “Dogmatic Dialogue in Phaedrus 267-7?” p.163, nicely points out a dilemma for [OU4]’s
model of oral dialectic: “If knowledge of truths can be transmitted [through dogmatic oral
teaching], why cannot this be done as well through writing as through oral discourse – indeed
perhaps done even better through writing?”
See Werner’s incisive critique of what he calls “thematic monism,” the assumption that the
Phaedrus contains one main or central theme to which all others are subordinate: Werner, “Plato’s
Phaedrus and the Problem of Unity,” pp. 94-109.
See Heath, “The Unity of the Phaedrus,” p. 173.
McCoy makes this point central to her interpretation of the Phaedrus: Marina McCoy, Plato on the
Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chapter 7.
This understanding of the dialogue’s structure is essentially Griswold’s: see Griswold, SelfKnowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, pp. 218-9, 230-33. See also Werner, “Plato’s Phaedrus and the Problem
of Unity,” pp. 120-22.
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